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Abstract
In this paper
paper we address the
problem ofensuring
Itz
rlze proble17z
of e/zsuri/zgthe
tlze corcorrectness of
private
retur-/led by
6). an
atz untrusted
u/ztrusted pn'vate
of query results returned
database. The
The database owns
okvtzs the
rlze data and may
/nay modify
nzodi' it
at any time.
rime. The
The querier is allowed
allo~vedto execute queries over
database; however it may
/nay not
/lot learn
Ieanz anything
a/z).thing more
nzore than
this database;
of these legal queries. The
The querier does not necthe result of
rlze owner
owtier to furessarily trust the database and would like the
proof that the data has not
nish
nor been modified
tnodijed in response
tzislz proof
to recent events suclz
such as the
tlze submission of
of the query.
query We
We
develop two metrics that capture the
rlze correctness of
of query
answers and propose
propose a range of
provide a
of solutions that provide
trade-off
private data,
rlze degree of
of exposure of
of private
data,
trade-off between the
proof
and the overhead
overhead ofgeneration
of generation and verification
verijcation ofthe
of tlze proof:
Our proposed
proposed solutio/zs
solutions are tested
rested through
rlzrouglz implementation
i/npleme/ztation
Llsing PostgreSQL.
using

1 Introduction
Consider the case of the food supply chain which is made
up of multiple entities: farms,
farms, processing plants, distribution centers, warehouses, and retailers. These entities are
typically independent, each with its own database that keeps
track of its operations. Each entity would like to prevent
other entities from learning the details of its operations as
this may yield an advantage to a competitor. However, there
are instances where it is necessary to provide access to some
of this private data in order to enhance public safety, and
comply with regulations. For example, if a packet of beef
sold at a given store is found to be contaminated, it is necessary to recall all other packages that may also be infected.
This entails searching through the private databases of various entities in the supply chain, beginning with the retailer
that sold the package that has been found to be contaminated, and working backwards (i.e.
(i.e. to the distributors, packagers, etc.) to locate the source of the problem and then

workin? forwards
forwards to track all possibly infected packages.
working
The current solutions to this problem are manual involving paperwork and result in long delays, sometimes days.
An automated solution to this problem would essentially remove these long delays and result in almost instantaneous
detection.
detection.
Automatic detection requires interaction between multiple PI-ivate
private databases involved in the food supply chain. To
support such queries, the databases can provide a limited interface into their databases that can be used either by other
entities in the supply chain,
chain. or a federal organization.
organization. There
is however,
however. one major problem: since the databases are under the control of individual organizations, there is no guarantee that changes are not made to the database in order to
produce misleading results. Providing incolTect
incorrect results can
help an organization protect itself or a partner from blame,
and shift the blame to another innocent party. Once again, it
is desirable that the external querier be able to obtain proof
proof
that the results returned by the database do reflect the coruncolTupted
rect evaluation of the submitted query over an uncoil-upted
version of the database.
generally. consider the case where a law enforcing
More generally,
(e.?. the FBI) wants to query a corporate database
agency (e.g.
for the purpose of ensuring compliance with regulations.
regulations.
The entity owning the data may be very concerned about
privacy and not be willing to reveal its entire database to
agency. At the same time, there is an issue of trust.
this agency.
The federal agency cannot blindly trust the corporation to
provide uncorrupted results, and would like to receive some
proof
proof from the database (which the agency cannot contest)
that it has provided the correct result. This proof
proof must handle the case that the database owner could have changed the
agency.
data once the investigation has begun to mislead the agency_
A similar problem exists with virtually any situation
where mutually distrusting entities need to exchange some
data while preserving the privacy of the rest of the database.
Emerging and recent regulations such as Sarbanes Oxley,
C m 2222 part I I1 also impose constraints on the handling
and CFR
of data owned by corporations. Solutions that can provide

guarantees of correctness of queries over these databases
without exposing the entire contents of the database are
highly desirable.
desirable. In all these examples, it is in the interest
of the database owner to share data with business partners
or regulatory agencies.
Thus in practice, there is a strong need for providing
guarantees of correctness of query results executed over a
private database not under the control of the querier. One
possible solution to this problem is to involve an external
e.g. the USDA in
entity that is trusted (willingly or by law), e.g.
the food supply example. Each database owner then sends
a copy of their database (and updates) to this trusted third
corpart): which can verify that the queries are executed corparty
rectly. In fact,
fact, it could execute the queries itself. There are
several problems with this solution: I)
1) This is a very exvolume of traffic to the
pensive solution with respect to the voluine
third party and also the requirements of storage at the third
party; 2) this third pasty
party is a potential weakness in the system -- if it is compromised, then too much private data may
be compromised; 3) the trusted party is now liable for the
privacy of the data -- it may be subjected to lawsuits claiming that it has leaked (willingly or unwillingly) private data
of one organization to another; and 4) such solutions would
be resisted by privacy advocates since there is too much of
a "Big Brother"
Brother" flavor.
flavor.
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been
addressed earlier. Existing solutions for tamper proofing au[15], or privacy-preserving database access [9,
[9, I],
11,
dit trails [15],
[6, 4, ll]
I 11 are not
and authentic third-party data publication [6,
applicable in this domain as discussed in the related work
section. In this paper we propose scalable solutions for
section.
the privacy-preserving
privacy-preserving query result verification problem and
develop a number of solutions that provide a tradeoff between the overhead for the owner, the efficiency of the veriowner's database
fication, and the degree of exposure of the owner's
in order to prove the colTectness
COITectness of a query. It should be
pointed, however, out that our solution is directly applicable
to the authentic third party data publication and the tamper
proofing of audit trail problems too (with no modification
whatsoever) with the added advantage that we do not need
to trust the owner of these databases.
databases.

folThe specific problem considered in this paper is as follows. We have two entities - the database owner (Bob) and
the querier (Alice). The two entities do not entirely trust
each other. Bob allows Alice to execute certain queries over
his private database. He is willing to reveal as little information as possible to Alice, apaI1
apart from the results of the
query.
query. Alice, on the other hand, is not necessarily confident
of the results she receives and may want a guaratltee
guarantee from
Bob that he has returned the correct results to Alice, without
after receiving Alice's
Alice's query).
modifying the database (e.g. afrer
Figure I1 shows the high-level model of the problem with
the possibility
possibility of a trusted third party. Alice can ask Bob to

commit to his database (while preserving its privacy) before
issuing a query.
query. Alternatively, Bob can periodically commit
the database. In this paper, the notion of "commit"
"commit" is that
Bob ensures that he can prove the authenticity of these data
at a later point in time. The important parameters of the
problem are: I)
1) providing a guarantee for correctness; 2)
the overhead on Bob and Alice; and 3) the degree of expoBob's data other than the query results.
sure of Bob's
\

Results,
Queries
Results. Overzes

Database h
e r
Database
Owner
(BOB)

Querier
(ALICE)

Verification

Prool

==;;7';;==="J~~,

/"
,I ,

":'---'---------,=.

,,

,

II

\

\\

\

I

1

II

,--c---L---

1

Privale
Database

II
I
rI

\\\

1....

I

~

1

I
I

I
I
I
II
I

I

I

Twrted
Third Parly
Party
Trusted Third

Figure
Figure 1. Interaction
Interaction between
between the entities.

In its full generality this problem is very hard to solve.
Note that the database owner can legitimately modify any
value in its database (e.g. the number of cans of soup sold
today). Thus we would need some means of distinguishing
valid modifications from invalid ones. This problem is very
hard to solve, and we believe that it is impractical to provide
guarantees about dynamic attributes -- i.e. those that change
over time as part of the operations of the database. We therefore begin by making the following assumptions
assumptions to limit the
scope of the problem. We assume that guarantees can only
be provided for data that is not modified after a given point
in time (e.g. the number of cans of soup sold yesterday or
earlier.). Bob freezes
freezes the values of certain data periodically
(e.g. daily or every few hours), after which no modification
or deletion of these data is allowed. (To be more precise,
modifications are allowed, but their authenticity cannot be
guaranteed.)
proof that it has frozen the
The owner generates a proof
database at regular intervals and ships that proof
proof to an external entity. This could be Alice, or a third party (note that
we do not need to fully trust this third party). The only requirement from the third party (if it is used) is that it does
not modify the proof. The inclusion of the third party is
only a minor issue and does not impact any of the details of
our solution. Consequently,
Consequently, throughout this paper we will
contributions of
assume that Alice receives the proof. The contributions
this paper are as follows:
follows:
1I.. Identification and formal statement of the untrusted
private database verification problem;

2. A range of solutions that vary in the degree of privacy

and the overhead of generating and verifying the proof
proof;
and
3. Details of a prototype implementation using PostgreSQL and experimental validation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. Section 3 gives a formal definition
of the problem and the model used in this paper. It also
provides a brief background on some relevant tools that will
be used in our solutions. Section 5 presents our proposed
solutions, and Section 6 discusses implementation details
and experimental results. Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 Related Work

The problem of private outsourcing of a database has
[7] wherein a semi-trusted third party is
also been studied [7]
used to host a database.
database. To protect privacy, the data is encrypted by the owner and stored only in encrypted format at
the host. This introduces challenges for efficient execution
of queries and creation of indexes [8].
[8].
To the best of our knowledge the problem of ensuring
conectness
correctness over untrusted private database has not been addressed earlier.

3

assumptions and trust
In this section, we describe the assumptions
model for the entities involved in the protocol.

3.1
3.1
There has been a recent surge in interest in privacy concerns for databases [1,9,2].
[ l . 9, 21. Several efforts have focused
on generating data mining results over multiple databases
while preserving privacy [9,
[9, 2, 5].
51. These protocols are
highly tailored to the mining algorithm and are not general
Furthelmore, they trust each of the owners of the
purpose. Furthennore,
correct data. A malicious
individual databases to provide con-ect
participant can mislead the group. Consequently, they are
inapplicable for the problem studied in this paper.
[IS] studied the problem of detecting
A recent paper [15]
intruder.
malicious modifications of data by an external intruder.
This is achieved through tamper detection of an audit log
of the database that records all changes. The database is
treated as an append-only database (in particular, a temporal database).
database). This work does not address privacy concerns
of the database and assumes complete trust of the database.
Our solution (with slight modifications) can be applied to
this problem.
[6] recently proposed a solution to the
Devanbu et al. [6]
problem of authentic third-party database publication. This
problem deals with a database owner that wishes to use a
third party to host his data. The owner does not entirely
trust the third party and would like to ensure that the values stored in the database are not modified by the host.
host.
Their solution does not address the problem of privacy of
the database.
database. Furthermore, the solution relies upon complete trust of the database owner. Although their solution
bears a superficial resemblance to ours (in terms of the use
trees). as discussed in Appendix A it is not appliof merkle trees),
cable to our problem. On the other hand, our solution can
be directly applied to the problem of authentic third-party
thii-d-party
database publication. Our solution is much more efficient
in terms of storage and computation as compared to the solution in [6].
[6]. The solution in [6]
[6] needs to specially address
join and selection that may be executed by the querier.
each join
Our solution does not suffer from this limitation. A related
[3] addresses similar issues for XML.
paper [3]

Assumptions and Model

Querier (Alice)
(Alice)
Querier

The database is located in a remote location over which
Alice has no control.
control. The database determines what types
of queries are allowed to be executed. In order to prove
that the results of allowed queries are correct, the database
("freezes") its current state.
state. Subseperiodically commits ("freezes")
quent queries must be guaranteed to return results computed
over this commit state. Any change to the committed values
should be detected. Alice may demand proof
proof of correctness
of a given result and also demand that data be committed
before submitting a query. Correctness of results can only
be guaranteed over committed data.
In case of such an update, Alice will either detect this
modification or Bob should send Alice the value of the tuple at the time it was frozen.
frozen. The application semantics
determines which of the above action is more appropriate.
In either case, this does not restrict the applicability of the
results of this paper.

3.2

(Bob)
Database owner (Bob)

The database owner controls the private database. He
has unconditional read and write access to the database. He
can intercept all the queries posed to the database and their
results:
results, and may even modify the results. In order to prove
correctness of the query results, Bob explicitly generthe conectness
freezing the data. Note that since Alice does
ates a proof
proof by freezing
proof of the freezing must be shipped
not trust Bob, some proof
outside of the database where it cannot be modified by Bob.
This can be achieved by either sending some information to
Alice, to a semi-trusted third party, or can be authenticated
by an independent authentication authority. We assume that
whatever data is frozen by Bob is correct. In practical settings, this is the same as recording entries in an accounts
ledger -- since the entries can be audited,
audited, the owner is discouraged from recording incorrect data. Similarly,
similarly, for the
current problem, there needs to be in place a mechanism

that enables a random audit of frozen data in order to enfreeze incolTect
incol~ectdata. Once a data
sure that Bob does not freeze
item is frozen, the protocol should not allow him to modify it -- i.e. Bob's hands should be tied with respect to the
frozen data. This is a reasonable assumption given that the
event which causes Bob to become malicious and skew the
results to his favor does not happen before Bob generates
and sends the proof. Nevertheless, we do not trust
tl-ust Bob to
follow the algorithm cOlTectly.
correctly. He may try to find loopholes
in the algorithm to generate
proof that does not tie his
genesate a proof
(e.g. as discussed in Appendix A, instead
hands completely (e.g.
freezing a tuple to one value, Bob may try to freeze it in
of freezing
such a way that allows him to report two or more possible
values for that tuple).
There is no restriction on how the query results can be
modified. Further, Bob is concerned about the privacy of
the database. He wishes to reveal only a minimal amount of
information to Alice, in addition to the query results.

al
al
a2

Correctness
Definition of Correctness

There are two aspects of correctness of query results.
correctness of
We now present two requirements for the conectness
database. Without loss
query results returned by a private database.
SPJ query
of generality, we can denote the result tuples of a SP]
(queries involving only select, projects and joins) as:

th
R; is the iit'?uple
tuple of the
where II11 denotes concatenation, Ri
result and R~
R
: refers to the value of projected attributes of
Tj.
correctness requirements
tuple iijj of table T
j . We divide the conectness
a- and ,6-cOITectness
0-col-rectness as defined below.
into a-

a-correctness This refers to the correctness of
of the
tlze result
values, i.e. the validity of the tuple values returned by the
values,
T
query. FOImally,
R~j ,
Folmally, this implies that the values returned, RiJJ,
must match values that were frozen when the proof
proof was generated.
P-correctness This refers to the correctness
correctriess of
of query
quety ex,6-correctness
ecution.
ecutiorz. It implies that the joins and selections were perth
correctly and the iit"
formed conectly
tuple of the result should in fact
i l . ii2,
. . . ii,q of tables
consist of (subset of) data from tuples iI,
2, ...
T II, T
,T2,
.. . T
T,q respectively.
respectively. This definition also checks for
2 , •..
set.
absence of valid tuples from the result set.
To understand ,6-conectness
P-correctness intuitively, it is helpful to
picture the database table as collection of tuple ids only.
E.g.
E.g. for a selection query ,6-correctness
P-correctness only tests whether
correct tuple ids are part of the result -- it does not check
the conect
whether the tuple data cOlTesponding
coi~espondingto these tuple ids is
unmodified. In case of joins, it checks that correct pairs

dl

d2
dl

Figure 2. Example
Example tables for Query CorrectFigure
ness.
ness.

of tuple ids from two tables are in the result. While,6While Pconectness
con-ectness does not check the tuple contents, a-correctness
ties the tuple id to the contents stored in the tuple,
tuple, and ensures that they are not tampered.
Consider two relations, R(A,
R ( A , B)
B) and S(A,
S ( A , C,
C, D),
D), and
the query
7rB,c(USD=d,

3.3

CI
C3
C2

(R ~R.A=S.A S))

Example instances of the two relations are shown in Figure 2. The COITect
col-rect result of the query should be the tubl,CI
ples: {< b,:
>; < b2 ~,c2
cz
: >}.
>). a-correctness
a - c o ~ ~ e c t n e srequires
s
cl >,<
the database to prove beyond any doubt that the tuples in
the result are indeed committed values. For this specific exb22 are part
bl and b
paI1 of
ample, this amounts to proving that bl
cl and C2).
c2).
some frozen tuples in table R (and similarly for CI
,6-correctness
,3-correctness requires that the selections and joins are correturned.
rectly performed and all the resulting tuples are returned.
bl,
cl
>) (an
,
CI
>}
For example, if the database only returns: {< b
l
incomplete result), or {< bl?
c, >,<
>: < bb2,
c2
>,
<
bl!
>)
incompleteresult),or{<
bl,CI
,C2
>,<
b
,C3
2
l c3 >}
bl;
cl
>,
<
b2,
c2
>,
<
bl,
c2
>
,
,
,
(incorrect selection) or {{<
< b
CI
>,
<
b
C2
>,
<
b
C2
>
l
l
2
}) (incorrect join) then Alice should be able to discover this
inconsistency. Note that all these results are a-COITect
a-COII-ectas the
values returned do belong to some tuple in the table. The,6The Pconectness
proof will verify that the tuples containing the
con-ectness proof
values returned (as certified by a-correctness) should in fact
query.
be in the result of the query.
These two definitions are independent of each other and
together imply the correctness of query results. As described later, for some specific cases we may not need the
,6-colTectness
,B-col~ectnessrequirement in order to verify the correctness
of query results.

3.4

Query

aThe solutions proposed in this paper can guarantee acorrectness for any arbitrary query over the database. How,3-correctness, we
ever, for the case of the more challenging ,6-correctness,
need to limit the types of queries of the form:
form:
(csl=al.s2=u2.....s,,=u,,(TI W

T~~.~?-....~7,,

T2

W . . . T,))

wherepl;
p2 ...
. . .Pm,
p,. 81,82,
s l ; ~ 2 ...
. ., . 8S n, are the attributes of the taPI, P2
where
,Tq of the database. The joins between the
TI,
G2 ,:.••
.. . ,T,
bles T
I,T

tables are assumed to be equality joins.
It should be noted that our approach can also prove correctness for queries whose results are essentially derived
from queries of the type shown above (e.g. aggregate
queries) by proving the correctness of the underlying query,
we can show that the derived query was also correctly evaluated. For example, we can prove correctness for a query
that computes an aggregate over a set of tuples generated
by a query of the type shown above. However, in order to
prove its authenticity, we would have to expose the values
of these tuples (i.e. we can not ensure the privacy of underlying query and expose only the aggregate).

4 Preliminaries
This paper employs two standard data security tools:
strong one-way hash
functions [13]
strorzg
haslz furzctiorzs
[13] and Merkle Trees
Trees [10].
[ 101.
We provide a brief
brief description of these tools before discussing the proposed solutions.

4.1
4.1

4.2

Merkle Trees

[ l o ] is a binary tree (not necessarily comA Merkle tree [10]
plete) with labeled nodes. The labels are binary strings
of length k. Let iI>(
n) represent the label of node n,
@(n)
n. thus
iI>(n)
@(n) E {a,
(0; l}k.
1)" The label for each internal node of the tree,
nPaTenl,
7zleft and nrighb
nTi,hl, is derived from the
nparent,
with children, nlejt
h as:
function, has:
labels of its children using a hash function,

The function hIz is a candidate one-way function such as
SHA-256. The above equation gives assignment of iI>
Q, for
internal nodes.
nodes. For leaf nodes, iI>
Q, is usually chosen depending upon the appl
ication of merkle trees. For example, iI>
application
Q, for
leaf can be the hash of a small part of a document whose
a leaf
integrity we want to establish.

,
, /'
,

A one-way hash is a function,
function, h,
h, that takes as input a
hash of the data
data item, x and produces as output the'
the'hash
= h(x).
h(x).Imp0l1ant
Important requirements for a one-way hash
item, y =
function are:
1.
y, and the details of the hashing
1. Given a hash value, y,
h,it is very difficult to find x such that h(
h(x)
function h,
x) =
y. In other words, given the hash of a data item it is
y.
hard to work back and determine the data value that
generated this hash value.

h(q) =:
;
h(y)for x ## yy is very
2. The probability that h(xJ
h(y)
low.
low. i.e., it is very unlikely that two different values
will yield the same hash.
y, it is virtually imposTherefore, given a hashed value, y,
sible to discover any data value that yields y as its hash
x is known, then it is virtually impossible
value. If a value x
z such that h(z)
h(z) =
= h(x).
h(x).Thus,
to generate a second value z
given a hash value y, it is possible to determine x such that
y=
= h(x)
h(x)only if x is already known (or one gets extremely
lucky).
lucky). There are many well-known and commonly used
strong one-way hash functions, such as SHA-256.
SHA-256.
functions are cryptocvptoAnother important class of hash functions
graphically secure keyed hash functions,
functions, denoted by hhl;.
k.
These work in much the same way as a one-way hash function, but they take as an additional input, a key, k. With such
function, given x it is not possible to determine hk
hk(x)
(x) even
a function,
if we know the hash function unless the key k is also known.
known.
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3. An example Merkle
Merkle tree. The black
Figure
nodes form
form the authentication
authentication path
path of shaded
shaded
nodes
block.
data block.

Merkle trees are used to establish the authenticity of the
leaf node labels. This is achieved by simply publishing the
root's label. Publishing in this context, refers
value of the root's
to recording the value in a manner that cannot be modified
later. This can be achieved by printing this value in a newsservice. With this pubpaper, or using an authentication service.
lished and unmodifiable value, one can now establish that
the value for any of the leaf labels has not been modified
after the publication of the root's
root's label. Consider for example, the merkle tree shown in Figure 3. In this example,
leaf nodes correspond to the hash values
the labels for the leaf
of data items whose authenticity we would like to establish.
In order to prove that the value of the data item x
x (shown
shaded in the figure)
figure) has not been modified, we simply need

to provide the value of x (the hash function for the tree is
well known), and the labels of the sibling nodes on the path
from x to the root. These nodes are shown as black circles
in the figure. This path is called the authentication path for
x. To verify the claim, one computes the labels of the nodes
@ for internal nodes.
along the path using the definition of cI>
If the computed label for the root matches the previously
If
published value then the value of x is authenticated.
authenticated.
To see why this is so, consider what happens if the value
of x has indeed been modified. Given the new value of x,
one would have to create labels for each sibling such that after repeated computations of the parent labels, the final hash
value is the same as the one that was generated earlier. By
functions, this is extremely
the very nature of one-way hash functions,
do, thus the labels cannot have been modified.
difficult to do,

5

Simple Model Solution

In this section, we discuss several solutions with various degrees of privacy, computational complexity and data
bandwidth. For the moment, we assume that the query contains only select operators and we are only verifying the (lacorrectness of the query results in each of these solutions.
solution, we
We will discuss the general case later. For each solution,
discuss the Proof of integrity
integrity that must be shipped by Bob
whenever he freezes the data, and the Verification
Verification steps that
Alice must carry out in order to establish the authenticity of
data in case she suspects foul play. We begin with a very
simple solution to illustrate the nature of the problem. In
the rest of the paper, the term database refers to the part of
Bob's private database that is frozen.
frozen.
Bob's
solutions, the hash function h1z is assumed
In all of these solutions,
to be public. The hash function implementations normally
take a sequence of bytes as input and returns an output of
length. Using this, we can define the function hlz on any
fixed length.
chunk of data in the database. For an attribute value,
value: hash is
simply the hash of bytes representing that value. For bigger
(ordered) set of attributes, hlz is defined
units like a tuple or (ordered)
as hash of concatenation of all the attributes making up that
tuple or set respectively.
In some solutions we assume that each tuple is identiRIDS. or for
fied uniquely. This can be achieved by using RIDs,
simplicity, generating an explicit ID within the database.
Solution 1 Proof of integrity:
integrity: Bob computes the hash of
the entire database and sends it to Alice.
Verification:
prove the authenticVerification: If
If challenged by Alice to pi-ove
ity of the results of a query,
query, Bob ships the entire contents of
the database to her. Alice can easily i) verify that the result
database; and ii) compute the
values are indeed part of this database;
hash of this database and verify if the overall hash match the
earlierproof.
earlier
proof. If these two values match, then Bob must have
sent the same database that was used to generate the earlier

proof
proof (given the difficulty of finding two numbers that hash
to the same value) and has not modified it since.
since.
This approach has the advantage that the database owner
needs to send only one number (the hash value) to Alice.
However, this is obviously a very bad solution since it violates the privacy of Bob's
Bob's database as he has to reveal the
entire database when challenged.
challenged. The bandwidth required
for verification is also huge as the entire database needs to
be shipped for verification.

integrity: We consider a strong hash
Solution 2 Proof of integrity:
ri in the
function h such as SHA-256. For each tuple Ti
= h(Ti)
lz(ri) and ships (i,
( i ,hi)
hi) Vi
'di
database, Bob generates hi =
to Alice.
Verification:As the result of a query, Alice gets back (i,
( i ;1'.;)
ri)
Verification:
for ii in the result set. She can easily hash the result tuples
and verify their integrity. In other words, no extra data is
needed for Alice to verify a result.
The ii used in this solution can be something which
uniquely identifies a tuple in a database table such as RID.
RIDS such as
We can use other approaches which do not use RIDs
sending the individual hashes in sorted order of hash value,
but using RIDs
RIDS makes the exposition easier. This approach
respects the privacy of Bob's database. There is no communication between Bob and Alice during the verification
phase as she has all the information needed to verify the
results. This approach can very easily be implemented by
maintaining a separate field for the hash along with each tuple. The hash is updated whenever a tuple is inserted or
modified. Although this increases privacy, it is not very
proof is proportional to the size
practical as the size of the proof
of database. The size of the proof, rather than the size of
the verification,
verificationt is the major concern as verification may be
rare (only when challenged by the querier) as compared to
sending the proof
proof of integrity (which may be periodic).
integrity: Let the tuples to be frozen
Solution 3 Proof of integrity:
be 1'1,1'2,
r1, r z ; . . . ,; 1·r,.n . Bob computes the hash of individual turl . . .?-,Tn with hash function hlz to generate a1
a1 . . .a,,
ples 1'1
an,
= h(Ti)'
Iz(ri). Next, he computes the hash of a1
al . . .a,
where ai =
an
to generate the final proof
proof which he ships to the querier.
lz(lz(rl)/l h ( ~ ~.). .llh(T
(. IIh(r,)).
I n )).
Thus the proof is h(h(Tdllh(T2)11··
Verification:Let the result set S
S be set of all tuple numbers
Verification:
returned by the query. i.e.,
i.e.? the result of the query is a set
{ ( j :Sj)}
s j ) ) j E S.
S . In order to verify this result, Alice asks
{(j,
( i lai),
a i ) ?Vi
'di tf-$ S.
S. She computes the hash of each
Bob for (i,
result b
Ljj == h(sj),
lz(sj),j E S.
S . Finally, she computes the hash
bjj and aj
aj hash values received from Bob. I.e.
1.e. Alice
over b
lz(cl IIc2l1 ...
. . . llc
IIc,)n ) where Ci
ci =
= bbii if ii E S,
S,and
computes: h(c11Ic211
ci == ai,
ai, otherwise. If
If this overall hash value equals the
Ci
proof sent earlier by Bob, then Alice is convinced that the
proof
database.
result values were indeed part of the frozen database.

As
As in
in the
the previous approach,
approach, this approach also respects
the
the privacy of the database.
database. But now, the proof
proof size is reduced
duced to
to just one
one number (the
(the final
final hash) at the cost of a
greatly increased verification size. This
This overhead associated
with hashing
hashing is
is similar to
to that in the previous approach. Assuming
suming the
the result set
set is
is small,
small, the size of the verification is
proportional to
to the
the size
size of the database.
database. Unless verification
phases are
are rare and bandwidth for
for verification is not a concern,
this
approach
is
not
practical.
However, this approach
cern, this approach is
in
which
the result set is large.
may be useful in
situations
in
Solution
Solution 44 Proof of integrity:
integrity:
This
This approach uses merkle trees to reduce the size of the
verification from
from O(N)
O ( N ) to O(Jog
O(1og N),
N ) , where N
N is the size of
the
database.
The
database
owner
computes
a merkle tree
the
The database
in
Section
4.
The
definition
of
merkle trees
as
described
as
in Section 4. The
of
([>
for
internal
nodes.
For
leaf node
gives
the
assignment
gives the
@ for
th
ii,
([>(li)
=
h('ri),
where
'ri
is
the
i
tuple
in
the
database.
li, @(li) = Iz(ri),
ri is
ith
database.
Bob
'root) as
Bob sends
sends ([>(
@(root)
as proof of integrity to Alice.
Verification:
Verification: For verification, Bob sends authentication
path for
for result tuples that need to be verified to Alice. The
length of such
such a path is
is equal
equal to the height of tree which
is
N).
is proportional to
to O(log
O(1og N ) . Alice computes the hash over
the
the result that she
she has
has received and the hash values along
the
the authentication path supplied by Bob.
Bob. If the overall hash
generated by Alice
Alice using the result values and the authentication
cation path hashes matches the proof sent earlier, all result
tuples are
are authenticated.
This approach preserves database privacy as it reveals
This
only
only the
the hashes
hashes of tuples that are
are not part of the result. Thus
Alice
Alice learns nothing about the values of the other data items.
the size
size of the proof is
is the same as in Solution 3 (one
(one
While the
single hash),
hash), the
the size
size of the verification is greatly reduced
single
from O(N)
O ( N ) to
to O(log
O(1og N).
N ) . The
The computational complexity is
from
proportional to
to number of nodes (both leaf and internal) of
proportional
the merkle tree. For a binary tree with N
N leaves, the total
the
nodes isis 2N
2 N -- 1.
1. Therefore, the computational
number of nodes
complexity of this approach is
is only twice as much as the
complexity
previous approach.
approach.
previous
Table I summarizes
summarizes the various solutions
solutions and their propTable
erties. These
These solutions were developed for ensuring aaerties.
correctness only with the assumption that no projects are
correctness
However, as
as explained below, they can be
performed. However,
extended to
to more general
general queries and also to prove (3Pextended
correctness (with
(with small
small modifications).
modifications).
COITectness

5.1
5.1

a-Correctness of General Queries

As discussed above,
above, Solution 4 is
is superior to the others
As
for verifying the
the a-correctness
a-correctness assuming
assuming that the number of
for
in the
the result set is
is small.
small. We next describe this aptuples in
in detail
detail for
for verifying
verifying the a-correctness
a-correctness in the genproach in
eral case.
case.
eral

5.1.1
5.1.1

Granularity of Hashing

In all of
of the above solutions, we have assumed that the tuof individual tuples.
ples are hashed at the granularity level of
This granularity determines how much information
information must be
revealed during verification. Consider a table has attributes
reveaIed
,an } and the query returns B
B c
c A as
A == {al,az,
{ a l , a z , ....
. . ,a,)
the result. During verification, for each result
result tuple, the
- B
B attributes must be revealed
revealed for the
values of all A of the results (by tracquerier to verify the a-correctness of
ing the authentication path). This increases the data bandof
width required for verification and reduces the privacy
privacy of
the database.
of hashing
To overcome this problem, the granularity of
can be adjusted so that no additional information
information is revealed during verification. For the above example query,
Bob would hash B
B and A - B
B separately, i.e. @(tuple)
([>(tuple) =
=
hash([>(B)
([>(A - B
B)),
([>(S)
= Iz(S)
h(S) for any
Izash(@(B) 11II @(A
) ) , where @
(S) =
SeA.
S c A. Now, in order to verify a result tuple which has
- B
B attributes
only R attributes, we do not need to reveal A of the A-B
A - B attributes for that tuple is sent to
--only
only the hash of
Alice. This enables the database to mask private attributes
of the result.
that are not accessible to Alice or not part of
of hashing, we can
Working with a finer granularity of
of the database when the query
avoid violating the privacy of
of the table. However,
result does not include all attributes of
at the same time, the finer granularity has a price associated
of hashing will increase the auwith it. A finer granularity of
thentication data needed for verifying a data item. It should
be noted that switching to a much finer granularity will inproof and verify the
crease the time needed to generate the proof
results as described in Section 7.
of the granularity for
Consequently, a judicious choice of
hashing needs to be made in order to balance the cost of
of
generating a proof
proof and the degree of
of exposure of
of private
pdvate
data during verification. Given a set of
of queries that will be
R; C
<;;: T
T be the set of
of
allowed to execute over a relation, let Ri
attributes queried by query i. The granularity of
of hashing for
T, GT =
Az;....
. .A
m ) : A j <;;: T
, is decided
Relation
RelationT,Gr
= {A1;
{A1,Az,
Am},Aj
T,isdecided
such that
1. AinAj=¢,'Vi,jE{1,2, ... m},i#j;and

2. 'Vi,3J
Vi:3Jii <;;: {I,
(1: 2;
. . m},
in),such that Ri
2.
2, ....
Ri =
= UjEJi
UjEJ; A j
The first condition ensures that we do not include an attribute in more than one hash.
hash, which would incur costs in
terms of efficiency and space. The second condition implies that we always have a subset of
of hashed attributes that
will cover all the attributes projected by any query. This
avoids the need to reveal any more information than what is
already revealed during the verification
verification phase.

Solution Sa
5 a We now present the final solution for proving
Solution
SP] queries, and also address an
a-correctness for arbitrary SPJ

Solution I1

Size
Size of Proof
Cost
Cost of Proof
Size
Size of Verification
Verification
Cost
Cost of Verification
Verification
Exposure
Exposure of Data

0(1)
O(1)

O(N)
O(N)
O(N)
O(N)
complete exposure

I Solution 2 I Solution 3 I Solution 4 ~
O(N)
O(N)
O(N)
0
O(S)
o(s)
no exposure

0(1)
O(I)
O(N)
O
m)
O(N)
O(N)
O(N)
no exposure

~

0(1)
O(
1)

O(N)
O(logN)
O(log
N)
O(logN)
O(log
N)
no exposure

Table
S is the size of result set),
Table 1.
1. Summary
Summary of various
various approaches
approaches (N
( N is
is the database
database size and S
assuming
S.
assuming no
no projections
projectionsand
and small
small result
result set S.

important attack for
for domains with small cardinality. With
these definitions,
definitions, we can redefine <I>(li)
@(li)for a leaf node Iili as

th
where
tuple
where Aj
A: refers
refers to
to the value of attribute(s) A jj for iitIL
and
@(A:.) == hash(Aj).
hash(Ai). Including
Including tuple
tuple id,
id, the unique
and <I>(Aj)
identifier for
for a tuple, in <I>(li) (and thus in the authentication
path of all
all attributes) allows the querier to verify if the data
for
for which a-correctness
a-correctness is
is being tested, does
does indeed belong
to
to tuples
tuples which are
are verified by the ,8-correctness
P-correctness verification
algorithm
algorithm as
as belonging to
to the result set.
set. It should be noted
that in
in the
the absence
absence of knowledge about which subsets of
attributes are
are likely to
to be queried, we can treat each attribute
as
as one
one of the
the Ai sets.
sets. This
This allows
allows us to provide maximal
privacy for
for all
all the
the attributes.
attributes.
definition, the leaf nodes of the merkle tree are
With this definition,
no longer labeled h(Ti)
h(l-i) corresponding
corresponding to tuple Ti.
ri. Instead,
no
h(A:)
the hash values
values of the various sets
sets of attributes values h(Aj)
the
form the
the new leaf level. The next level up contains one
form
for each
each tuple Ti
ri of the database.
database. Its label is the hash
node for
m leaves of tuple Ti:
ri:
the concatenation of labels for
for the m
of the
h(A:.); j == l..m
1..m and the tuplejd
tuple-id for Ti.
ri. This grouping
h(Aj),j
the hashes of attribute of one tuple simplifies the
together of the
allows Alice to easily verify whether
implementation and allows
two attributes reported (by query results) as part of one tuple
two
of the table
table are
are in
in fact
fact part of one tuple and not two different
ofthe
tuples.

We redefine <I>(Aj)
@(A;) for attributes with small domain cardinality to be:
hash(A~IISi.j)

<I>(Aj)

=

Si.j

hdtable idllill.j)

=

where Si.j
of tuple i, and hhkk is a
Si,jis the salt for attribute j of
cryptographically
cryptographically secure keyed hash function. The key k is
kept secret by the database owner.
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5.1.2 Handling attributes
attributes with
with small domains
5.1.2
The security of hash functions
functions depends on the assumption
The
the domain of the hash function is large.
large. If the dodothat the
is small
small (e.g. age)
age) a simple
simple dictionary attack will allow
main is
the querier to
to deduce
deduce the attribute values from their hashes.
the
(e.g. every
The querier simply
simply hashes each possible value (e.g.
The
age from
from I1 to
to 120,
120, say)
say) to produce the corresponding hash.
age
Comparing these hash values with the hash values of private
fields allows
allows the
the querier to determine
determine the value of the field.
fields
We solve
solve this
this problem by generating the hash of the data
We
value concatenated with another value not known to Alice.
This secret
secret value
value is
is called "salt".
"salt".
This

Figure 4. Hash
Hash tree for a-correctness. The
Figure
shaded nodes
nodes forms the authentication
authentication path
of data item
item A;
Aj

The size of
of the salt Sij must be large enough to make
dictionary attacks computationally very difficult
difficult for Alice.
Si:j must be revealed to Alice for verification of
Si,)
of Ai.
Aj. Figure
J..
44 shows a hash tree and the complete authenticat~on
authentication path
path
for a data item A:.
A). In order to verify an attribute value,

of the data (A:)
(Aj) and the
Alice will be given both the value of
of the corresponding salt (Si>j)
(Si,j) used
used to generate the
value of
released for verification, we cannot
proof. Since the salt is released
different salt
use a single value for all data items. Managing different
values for each data item can be quite cumbersome (and
both these problems,
consume storage) for Bob. To avoid both
we defining the salt such that it can be derived from the
of the data item through
through a different hash function hk.
value of
"remember" the hash for any data value
Thus Bob can easily "remember"
- no need to save the salt.
rcx to be simply hhdx)
k(x) of results
As described in Section 3, the a-correctness of
of results. In some
alone does not establish the correctness of
a-correctness
special cases, however, verifying only the cr-correctness
if the total number of
of tuples that must
suffices. For example, if
returned by a query is known and all join
join and selection
be retuned
of
attributes are retained in the result, then the correctness of
query results is completely determined by its a-correctness.
of the results
a-COITectness of
Note that we can verify the a-col-rectness
for any general query. The restriction on queries given in
(J-correctness.
Section 3 is necessary only for verifying @-correctness.

5.2

1. Ai

Vi,3K
2. 'di,
3Kii

c

{A},A
},A
{ A 1 , A22, ,...
. . . .,A
Am
, A 3j <;;;;T,
CT,
m}

rP, Vi,j E {I, 2, .. . m},i f j; and

{1,2,
m}and3L
<;;;; {
{1,2,
m},such
c<;;;; (1:
2 ; ....
. .in}
and 3L;i C
1 , 2 , ....
. .m},
such

U Ak;

Si

kEK;

=

U Al
IEL;

maximal, disjoint subsets of
of atIn other words, we identify maximal;
tributes of
of each relation
relation T
T such that we can obtain each
of the sets required for selections and joins
joins over this relaof
tion for every query. Note that we can always satisfy these
conditions by picking each set A?
Ai consisting of
of a single at(J-colTectness.
tribute. We now propose a solution for @-col~ectness.

I,

I

c

=

Ji =

I

T,, UT
UT,,i2 are projected attributes, Si
S, <;;;; Til
T,, UT
UT,,i2
where Pi
P, <;;;; Til
are selection attributes
,)
are
T,, (and JJ,i <;;;;
C TT,,)
attributes and JJ,i <;;;; Til
i
join attributes. Note that the selections and joins are both
based on equality (Section 3). To
To prove the (J-correctness
p-correctness
of results without revealing any additional information we
enforce
enforce the following
following conditions
conditions on the granularity G
GT
T =

j

that

(J-correctness
Verifying @-correctness

In the previous section, we discussed how we can modof the results
ify merkle trees to establish the a-correctness of
which ensures that all values returned by the query were indeed frozen by the database. In this section we suggest so(J-correctness which ensures that all
lutions for establishing p-correctness
querier. For this, we need
results for a query are sent to the querier.
to make sure that the query engine performs all the joins
and selects correctly.
correctly. This is challenging because Bob,
Bob. the
database owner, is not willing to reveal the entire database
due to privacy concerns.
concerns. Merkle trees can be very bandwidth efficient for a-correctness as discussed previously,
but they cannot be used for (J-correctness.
p-correctness. This is due to
the fact that we need information about the entire database
for verifying the (J-correctness.
p-correctness.
As discussed earlier (Section 3), for (J-correctness
p-correctness we
will assume that the queries only contain equality joins. We
use a modified version of the hash tree described in Solution
3.
3. First, we need to define the granularity of hashing to
prevent violation of privacy similar to what was proposed
above for a-conectness
a-correctness in Solution Sa.
5a.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the query
is
qi
47 =
= 7fP;(O"S,(T
TP" i ~ s(T,,
, i, IXl
W JJ, ~T
TT2
i2 ))
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Hash

Solution
Solution 5(J
5@
P-col~ectnessis
The hash tree over one database table for (J-colTectness
defined as follows:

<I>(7'Oot) = hash(<I>(ldll<I>(l2)II·· ·11<I>(ln))
cI>(li) = hash(tuple idll<I>(A;)II<I>(A;)II ... 11cI>(A~))
<I>(Aj) = hash(A;IISi,j)
Si,j = Sd(Aj)

S d ( A j ) is the digital signature of Bob on value Aj
AS
where, Sd(A;)
with the private key d.
d. The corresponding public key e is
Alice. As described later,
later, using a simple keyed
known to Alice.
a-correctness) is
hash as the salt (similar to our solution for a-correctness)
not sufficient to ensure the (J
4 correctness. Figure S5 shows
L1: 12, ...
. . . ,: in
1, corthe hash tree described above. The nodes l},
respond to each tuple of the table.
li) simWe have included tuple id in the definition of cI>(
@(li)
@ ( l i ) for a-correctness.
a-correctness. Keeping
ilar to the definition of <I>(li)
identifier along with the tuples
tuples in both (a
( a and
this unique identifier
!J)
p ) trees helps Alice to verify that the authentication paths
for the same
same data
for aa and ,30proofs are for
provided by Bob for
item. If we remove tuple id from
from the above definition,
definition, it is
is
item.

authenticapossible for Bob to fool Alice, by providing an authenticaa-proof verification
verification and path for a
tion path for one tuple for a-proof
different tuple for 0-proof
,8-proof verification
verification (possibly having one
different
Without the
or more attribute values equal to the first tuple). Without
unique tuple ids, Alice will have no way to verify ifif the two
point to the same tuples. Thus, tuple ids serve to link
proofs point
the two proofs together.
proof sending phase, the database owner,
During the proof
<I>(root) for each table to Alice. If
If Alice
Bob, only sends @(root)
verification after executing a query, Bob sends (for
requests verification
<I>(Aj), Vi, j and Si,;
8 i ,j for all
all tables involved in the query) @(A$),
the A jj attributes that are involved in a selection.
if the value of
of @(root)
<I> (root) sent for each table
Alice checks if
of all @(A:)
<I>(A~) sent
matches the value calculated by using hash of
If that succeeds, she only needs to prove that the
by Bob. If
joins and selections are pelformed
peIformed correctly by the database
joins
,8-correctness.
to prove ,&correctness.
of selection, Alice checks the
COiTectness of
To check the correctness
(of the form A;
Aj =
= aaj,
j:
following condition for all selections (of
peIformed by the query: Vi:
Vi, if
if
where aajj is a constant) performed
<I>(Aj)
118i ,j) then tuple ii is present in the result
@
( A ) )== hhash(aj
a s h ( a j IISiZj)
set. Additionally, she needs to verify that for the tuples re8 i ,j matches
turned in response to the query, the signature SiZj
Bob's
the signature of Bob. This can be verified by using Bob's
public key e.
If
of salt Si,j
8 i ,j is chosen to be hk(A$)
hdAj) (similar to
If the value of
a-correctness), it is possible for Bob to actually return two
of answers in response to a single
(or more) different sets of
proof for each of
of
selection query and provide a correctness proof
them. This is against our assumptions
assumptions where we want Bob
to commit to exactly one state of the database. This attack
is possible because Bob may choose to use different keys
just one key for all
for the hash function instead of using just
the tuples in the database (as required by the the protocol).
Defining 8
Sif
i ,j as Bob's digital signature on attribute value
and later verifying it at Alice's end prevents this problem.
join was performed correctly, Alice
To verify if the join
checks the following for attributes (say A jj ) of joined
joined taVil,
= 1,2,
1 , 2 , ...
. . . ,nif<I>(Aj')
,n if @(A>) == <I>(A~2)thentuples
@(A:) then tuples
bles: Vi
1 ,iia2 =
iil1 and iiz2 are included in the result.
result.
Our solution for aa and ,8
p correctness requires Bob to
send 21D[
21Dl (root nodes of two trees per table) hashes during
the proof
ID1 is the number of tables
proof sending phase, where IDI
in the database.
database. These hashes can be easily combined into
one hash to reduce the proof
proof size at the cost of one extra
level in all authentication paths.

6 Implementation
Implementation
We have implemented our proposed solution in PostgreSQL [12).
[12]. The
The algorithms
algorithms for
for generating hash trees over
the database
PLIpgSQL. We used the
database were implemented in PLlpgSQL.
implementation of the hash function SHA-l
SHA-1 from
from OpenSSL

crypto library [14] for our experiments. The database has
been extended to allow the owner to freeze data values
authentication
by generating proofs, and also supporting authentication
of query results. In our implementation, the timing of
of the
of
freezing can also be controlled by the querier. Whenever
the querier wants the database to freeze its values, it issend_proof command to the database. On receiving
receiving
sues a send-proof
the ssend_proof
e n d p r o o f command the database sends a single hash
If the querier wants to verify the results,
value to the querier. If
send_verify command to the database. On receipt
it issues a send-verify
of
of send-verify
send_verify the database returns the authentication paths
for all tuples in the query result being verified. For simplicity, we have implemented an append-only database. But its
relatively easy to extend it for general databases. In particular, we have to write an update trigger to update the hash
tree whenever data in a node is modified. We implement
(3).
Solution 5 ((aa and p).
The hash trees can be generated over the tuples to be
frozen when the ssend_proof
e n d p r o o f command is received by the
database. However, this approach will have a large overof send-proof.
send_proof. A better alternative will be
head on receipt of
to generate the tree as tuples are added to the database. This
approach distributes the load evenly during the database updates.
For generating and storing the tree, we add the following
tables to the database.
hash_tree
database. We create a new table - haslz-tree
(node id,phi,parent)
(node-id.
phi: pal-e~rt)to store the generated hash tree. In
of the child nodes is
this tree representation, the ordering of
not explicit.
explicit. For a given parent node, the child nodes are
implicitly ordered by increasing node ids. For example, the
child with lowest node id is considered as the leftmost child.
A global counter (count)
(count) is used to obtain new node_id
node-id values. The schema of each original table in the database is
modified to add a new attribute called node_id.
~rode-id. A temporary table, heiglzt-table(height,
node-id) is also created.
heighuable(height, Ilode_id)
Upon insertion of a new tuple into the database, the
add-node algorithm (refer Figure 6) is executed (by means
add_node
of a trigger). By means of the add_node
add-node algorithm, a
forest of partial merkle trees over the current rows of the
database is constantly maintained. The roots of such trees
height-table. On receipt of
are stored in a temporary table, heighuable.
a send_proof
7) request, the database merges these
send-proof (Figure
(Figure 7)
as
partial trees into one tree and returns the root of this tree as
the proof.
After the send_proof
send-proof algorithm is executed, the database
database. Given this
has a complete merkle tree over the database.
send-verify algorithm is easy. For each tumerkle tree, send_verify
ple in the result, the database returns an authentication path
hash-tree table. Note that the authenauthenwith the help of the hash_tree
will overlap and this can be
tication paths of these tuples will
further reduce the size of verification data.
data. The
used to further
querier on receipt of this authentication path calculates the
hashes and traces back the authentication path to the root

1. Let h=hash(table(tuplejd))
h=hash(table(tupleid))

hash-tree (count++, h, NULL)
2. INSERT INTO hash_tree

1. For
F o r temp =
= SELECT nodejd
node-id FROM heighuable
height-table ORDER BY height do

3. currenLnode=count-l

If this is the first iteration then set node=temp and
(a) If
jump to next iteration

4. UPDATE table SET nodejd
node-id = currentJlode
currentnode WHERE
key=tupleid
key=tuplejd

(b) Let
h
hash(hash_tree(temp).phi
=
hash(hash-tree(temp).phi
hash_tree(node).phi)
hash-tree(node).phi)

5. current..height=O

(c) INSERT INTO hash_tree
hash-tree (count++,h,NULL)
(count++.h.NULL)

= SELECT nodejd
node-id FROM heighuable
height-table
6. Let temp =
= current..height
currentheight
WHERE height =

If temp -=I# NULL
7. If
h=hash(hash-tree(temp)IIII
(a) h=hash(hash_tree(temp)
hash_tree(currentJlode))
hash-tree(currentn0de))
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(d) UPDATE hash_tree
hash-tree SET parent = count-l
count-1
WHERE (nodejd
node-id = temp)
(node-id = node OR nodejd

count- 1
(e) node = count-l
2. return hash_tree(node).phi
hash-tree(node).phi
2.

Figure 7. Pseudo
Pseudo code
code for send_proof
send-proof
Figure

(b) INSERT INTO hash_tree
hash-tree (count++, h, NULL)
(c) UPDATE hash_tree
parenLid =
hash-tree SET parent-id
= (count - 1)
1)
WHERE (nodejd
(nodeid = temp OR nodejd
node-id =
= currentJlode)
rentaode)

height-table WHERE height =
(d) DELETE FROM heighUable
currentheight
current..height
currentheight++; cunentJlode
cull-entnode =
= count-I
count - 1
(e) current..height++;
(t)
(0GOTO
GOT0 6

8. else INSERT INTO heighUable
height-table (current..height,
(currentheight, cur8.
rentaode)
rentJlode)
Figure
Figure 6. Pseudo
Pseudo code
code for add_node(tuple-jd,
add-node(tupleid,
table). tuple_id
tuple-id is
is the new tuple
tuple that is
is to be
is the database taadded to the tree and
and table is
added
in which
which tupleJd
tuple-id resides
resides
ble in

and checks if the final hash matches the value sent to it earlier by send_proof
send-proof algorithm.
algorithm.
0The implementation of our solution to prove 13correctness is simple because of the simplicity of the hash
conectness
tree structure defined for it.

6.1
6.1

Efficiency

A number of optimizations are possible for the algorithm presented above to reduce the space overhead associated with maintaining the merkle trees on the database side.
These optimizations come at the cost of additional processing required by the database during the proof
proof verification
phase. This may be desirable if we assume that the verification phase is rare (i.e. only when the querier suspects foul
foul
play and asks the database to send authentication paths). To
achieve this, we note that the entire trees are not required

in the add_node
add-node and send_proof
send-proof algorithms.
algorithms. We only need
generated. We can easily ignore
the root of the partial trees generated.
the hash_tree
haslz-tree table and store the hashes of trees at height h
in the heighuable
height-table (note that there can be only one tree at
height h).
lz). This reduces the space overhead tremendously,
tremendously.
but the ready-made merkle tree over the database will not be
available when executing the send_verification_data
send-verification-data algorithm. Thus, before executing this algorithm the merkle tree
that was used to generate the proof
proof will need to be recreated.
This increases the time complexity of the send verification
algorithm.
Further, we did not consider the situation when the
querier asks for proof
proof more then once (or maybe periodically).
cally). In this case, we can introduce optimizations with
various space-time tradeoffs on both the database side and
side. Assume that the querier asks for the proofs
the querier side.
day. The database now has two
periodically, say once a day.
choices: (l)
(1) Bob can maintain one large merkle tree over
the entire database and send the root of this tree whenever
approach, the size of
he needs to send the proof. In this approach,
the merkle tree will gradually increase. This will increase
the amount of data that is exchanged between the two parties for proof
proof sending and verification; or (2) The other approach is to maintain many merkle trees -- one merkle tree
for each proof
proof that Bob sends to Alice. Each merkle tree
proof was
only covers the data that is added after the last proof
small.
sent. This keeps the size of the merkle trees very small.
The disadvantage is that Alice has to keep all the previous
corresponding to data on which she can possibly run
hashes conesponding
a query at any future time.

7 Experimental Results
The experiments were performed on a SUN SPARC
I GB of RAM. Data from a Walmart data
workstation with IGB

warehouse was used for all experiments.

7.1
7.1

Overhead of proof generation

In this experiment, the overhead caused by proof
proof
We generated a hash-tree
generation was studied.
studied.
for a-correctness verification over different table sizes.
The schema of the table used for this experiment is
sales(itemid, units...sold).
unitssold). First, tuples were inserted into
sales(item--id,
the database. Then a hash tree over these tuples was generated. Tuple level granularity was used while generating the
hash tree. For comparison, the time taken by the database
in inserting the tuples is also plotted along with the cost of
generation. Figure 8 show the results of this expera-proof generation.
sizes. The x-axis gives the number
iment for different table sizes.
of tuples added to the relation, and the y-axis gives the actual time taken for the insertions in seconds. This time was
measured using the UNIX time utility. The graph shows the
time required to insert a tuple and also the time required to
make necessary changes to the trees. Note that this implementation uses triggers for tree creation which may not be
the most efficient implementation. However, the cost of tree
maintenance is on the same order of magnitude as the cost
of a single tuple insertion.
Overhead for proof generation
220
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Secondly, because of the single level structure of this hash
tree, we only need to compute one additional hash (over all
leaves) to obtain the root hash. Figure 8 presents the results
of this experiment.
Once again, we see an almost linear relationship between
the number of tuples in the table and the time required to
process the insertions. The overhead for this tree is indeed
very small compared to the time required for generating the
a-correctness tree.

7.2

Amortizing proof generation cost

In the previous experiments,
experiments, the hash tree generation was
done lazily -- after inserting a large number of tuples. It resulted in a significant overhead whenever the database is
frozen. As mentioned in Section 6,
6, the hash tree generafrozen.
tion can also be done eagerly. This results in a cost penalty
during insertions to the database, but the freezing of the
fast. In a way, the eager approach amordatabase is quite fast.
tizes the cost of hash tree generation over insertions.
This experiment compares the two approaches in terms
of a-correctness proof
proof generation.
generation. The hashing was done
at the granularity of tuples. The database was periodically
frozen (after insertion of 2000 tuples). Figure 9 shows
the time taken by the two approaches as tuples were inserted into the table. In case of lazy computation, the flat
lines show the insertion cost. After 2000 insertions, the
send-proof command is sent to the database.
database. After receivsend.proof
ing this command the database starts computing the hash
tree. This results in a significant overhead as shown by the
vertical lines. On the other hand, in case of eager evaluation, each tuple insertion triggers a function that partially
computes the hash tree. This allows the database to quickly
freeze itself, whenever a send.proof
send-proof command is received.

7.3

Granularity of hashing
hashing
Granularity

OL--'-----~~~---'-~-~-~-~-~-----.J

o

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
Number of Tuples

Figure 8. Overhead
Overhead of proof generation
generation
Figure
The results establish that the cost of generating the aaproof
proof hash tree increases linearly with the size of database.
For small table sizes, this cost is roughly equal to the cost
incurred in inserting the tuples in the database. Both these
costs increase linearly and the tree generation cost slope is
roughly twice of that of insertion cost.
For ,B-correctness,
p-correctness, the experiment was run on the same
table used in the above experiment.
experiment. We expect the overhead of generating this hash tree to be low. This is because
the hash of the data tuples is already available to us (as
they are calculated during a-correctness proof
proof generation).

As explained earlier, the granularity of hashing determines the data exposure. While keeping a finer granularity seems attractive, this has a performance cost associated
with it. This experiment studies the tradeoff
tradeoff between performance and granularity. The table used for this experiment
16 attributes and 1000 tuples. Different granularities
has 16
of hashing were tested and the hash tree (for a-correctness)
was generated to measure the performance cost. Figure 10
10
shows that the proof
proof generation cost increases linearly with
the granularity. The x-axis represents the cardinality of G
GT
T
for the table.

8 Conclusions
In this paper we addressed the problem of ensuring
con-ectness of query results received from a private
the conectness
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A Authentic Third Party database
database publicapublication
The crucial difference between the model proposed in
this paper and the model of authentic third-party database
publication [6]
[6] is that we do not trust the database owner
to follow the proof
proof generation algorithm honestly. Similar to our a-correctness solution,
solution, [6]
[6] uses merkle trees to
generate proof
proof of conectness.
correctness. The algorithm presented in
[6]
[6] assumes that the database is sorted on the attribute on
which selection is performed. To ensure ;3-correctness
P-correctness it
simply reveals one tuple before and after the result set.
set. This
ensures that no tuples are missing from the result. The solution works because the database owner is trusted with the
task of properly sorting the database on the selection key
before freezing it. While this is a reasonable assumption
for third-party database publication, it does not hold for our
problem model. If
If we remove the assumption of trust on the
database owner, then the solutions presented in [6]
[6] will not
work. This is explained in the following example.
example.

~ itemjd I units sold
1
105
2
97
221
3
I
105
2
0
3
221
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Figure
Figure 11. Example
Example database
database

Consider the example presented in Figure II.
1 1. Note that
the database owner Bob has (maliciously) frozen two values
for the number of units sold for item id 2 (along with correct
values for items 1 and 3).
3). This scenario is quite possible
if Bob does not want tie down his hands completely and
would like to change the quantity of item 2 sold based on
some future
future information.
information. Given the query:

If
If we use the solutions presented in [6],
[6], Bob can either report 97 or 0 and provide a proof
proof of correctness for the same!
same!
In our approach, this is not possible as Bob would not be
able to prove ;3-correctness
P-correctness for this query. Hence, the previous solutions based on the model of authentic third-party
predatabase publication is not applicable to the problem psesented in this paper.

